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An Empirical Case Study of 
Informal Alternative Dispute Resolution 
RONALD J. BACIGAL * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional view of litigation posits a neutral and detached judge 
who sits back passively until counsel have framed the disputed issues 
in appropriate motions requiring formal judicial decisions. Disengagement 
and dispassion during the early stages of litigation supposedly enable 
judges to decide cases impartially. Under the classic model of judicial 
passivity, the prime responsibility for the orderly and prompt presentation 
of litigation rests with the bar.1 However, this classic view of the 
respective roles of the bench and bar does not operate efficiently in 
complex litigation2 where counsel may "waste time and expense if the 
judge passively waits until problems have arisen."3 
Getting a case to trial is often an ordeal, as skirmishing over procedural 
matters can result in huge expenses and years of delay.4 In complex 
cases with high financial stakes, counsel often display a tendency to 
expand the dispute and the pretrial process to the limits of the parties' 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S. 
1964, Concord College; LL.B. 1967, Washington & Lee University. 
I. See generally Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, 
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667-70 (1979). 
2. Professor Schuck defines a complex case as one that exhibits some or all of the 
following features: 
Numerous parties raising unprecedented claims, which are to be resolved on the 
basis of a massive and ambiguous factual record concerning events or relationships 
that span long time periods and large geographical areas, and which will require 
resolution of novel procedural, choice-of-law, substantive, and remedial issues. Ad-
judication of such a case is very costly and time-consuming, and any judgment or 
settlement reached, even one for money damages, is likely to be difficult to implement. 
Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 338 n.7 (1986). For a discussion of the legal complexities of 
mass tort litigation, see Landes & Posner, Tort Laws as a Regulatory Regime for 
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984). 
3. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, Second, § 20.1 (3d ed. 1985). 
4. One lawyer who practices nationally confirmed that in many courts "[y]ou learn 
your case as you go--after filing" a suit. With an open-ended court calendar, "you file 
a zillion interrogatories, 50 deposition notices and go on a great fishing expedition." 
Barrett, "Rocket Docket": Federal Courts in Virginia Dispense Speedy Justice, Wall St. 
J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 33, col. 3. 
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pocketbooks.5 The incentive to "overwork" a complex case flows from 
the realization that the set of potentially relevant facts is almost limitless 
in complex litigation, thus leading to massive over-discovery.6 In addition, 
lawyers are subject to Parkinson's Law that work tends to expand to 
fill the time available, a tendency which is further driven by the billable-
hours syndrome.7 For people of modest means, justice delayed is justice 
denied. 
With the recent emphasis on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
many judges have challenged the assumption that justice is most likely 
to prevail when the judiciary sits back and allows free-swinging con-
frontation. Such judges have dropped their relatively disinterested pose 
to adopt a more active, "managerial" stance. 8 This active stance may 
be demonstrated by formalized ADR procedures or it may consist of a 
set of informal techniques designed to supervise case preparation and 
induce settlements.9 Ad hoc judicial activism has its defenders10 and its 
detractors,11 but final judgment must await further empirical research12 
into the specific techniques utilized by managerial judges. A better 
understanding of the managerial process cannot exist until we learn 
what characteristics of cases make them appropriate candidates for 
particular managerial techniques. While sound first steps have been 
taken to study the process,13 "one of the crying research needs in civil 
procedure is for empirical studies of how managerial judging actually 
works in practice."14 
This Article is excerpted from a forthcoming authorized biography 
of Federal District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Judge Merhige has 
5. Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
306, 320 (1986). 
6. See Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal 
Rules: On the Limited Use of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 722 (1983). 
7. See Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 223 (1978) 
(condemning a system in which "hours are the criterion of pay."). 
8. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). 
9. "Managerial judges believe that the system does not work; that something must 
be done to make it work; and that the only plausible solution to the problem is ad hoc 
procedural activism by judges." Elliott, supra note 5, at 309. 
10. See Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, 
Ten-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 Rl.ITGERS L. REV. 
253 (1985); Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 
YALE L.J. 1643 (1985). 
11. See Resnick, supra note 8; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
12. The acid test of an evolving theory of litigation is not whether the theory is "true" 
in a purely academic sense, but whether the theory is useful in describing the "real" 
world. See Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 
92-93 (1985). 
13. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE COURTS {1986). 
14. Elliott, supra note 5, at 326. See also Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, The Use 
of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 
(1987) (pointing out the lack of empirical research in bankruptcy law). 
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been labelled a judicial activist, a trial court's William 0. Douglas,15 
and the prototype for the modern activist judge.16 While eschewing the 
activist label, Merhige subscribes to the view that an effective judge 
has a responsibility to "push settlements."17 Merhige's Eastern District 
of Virginia has been dubbed the "rocket docket" because it consistently 
beats all ninety-three other federal jurisdictions in elapsed time between 
the filing of a litigant's papers and the start of a civil trial. The national 
median is fourteen months, and in some districts, it is more than two 
years. But in the rocket docket, it is only five months.18 
The following Article is taken from that portion of Merhige's biography 
that addresses the Westinghouse uranium case of the 1970s, perhaps 
the first of the major "complex cases" to attract national attention. 
This case study provides an opportunity to examine a judicial decision-
making process involving four years of litigation, international discovery 
proceedings, judicial administrative guidelines, diverse national precepts 
of economics and politics, the interplay between the free market and 
multinational cartels and embargoes, and lastly, the personality of the 
trial judge. Shunning any pretense of passivity, Merhige initiated pro-
ceedings in the Westinghouse case by ignoring administrative protocol 
in order to fly to England and convene international discovery pro-
ceedings. Merhige refused to accept Attorney General Griffin Bell's 
promise to grant executive immunity to witnesses; he then issued a grant 
of judicial immunity which was ultimately overturned by the British 
House of Lords. Addressing the merits of the case, Merhige offered a 
qualified ruling which he used to maneuver the parties toward a set-
tlement on damages. His settlement efforts varied from hosting nego-
tiation cocktail parties in his own home to requiring counsel to work 
on "Saturdays, Sundays, and some days that aren't even on the cal-
endar. "19 Merhige's unorthodox approach predates modern formalized 
ADR procedures, but his candid reflections upon his role in the West-
inghouse case help reveal the impact that a judge's personality can have 
upon settlement of major litigation. 
15. "Merhige is one of the most respected federal judges in the country, an activist 
who moves cases in and out of his court like a drillmaster and who, if he is criticized 
at all, is faulted for too readily exercising the considerable power of his judgeship." J. 
STEWART, THE PARTNERS 168 (1983). 
16. Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 471. 
17. Will, Merhige & Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 
F.R.D. 89, 203, 217 (1977). 
18. Barrett, supra note 4. 
19. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from interviews with The Honorable 
Robert R. Merhige, Jr., conducted in Richmond, Virginia throughout 1985-87. 
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II. THE WESTINGHOUSE URANIUM CASE 
A. Background 
On September 8, 1975, the Westinghouse Corporation dropped a 
bombshell on the nuclear power industry by announcing that Westing-
house would not honor contracts to deliver seventy million tons of 
uranium.20 It was a default of unheard-of proportions, representing thirty 
percent of total industry requirements. Within six months the open 
market price of uranium more than quadrupled, and every dollar rise 
in the price of uranium meant an additional sixty-five million dollars 
loss for Westinghouse.21 Westinghouse's jilted customers filed suit to 
force Westinghouse to supply the uranium at the contract price, or to 
pay damages amounting to two billion dollars. The resulting litigation 
dragged on for over a decade,22 led Merhige to London where he became 
the first federal judge to hold court in a foreign country, and tested 
his creativity in resolving a centuries-old problem of contract law. 
The background of Westinghouse's legal and financial problems was 
intimately connected with the development of commercial nuclear power 
in the United States. Throughout the 1950s, the American government 
moved to solidify its position as the world's first nuclear power by 
encouraging vigorous expansion of the uranium mining industry.23 By 
1960, however, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)24 had stockpiled 
an oversupply of enriched uranium. When the AEC drastically reduced 
its planned purchases, the uranium mining industry fell upon hard times. 
Within a five-year period the number of operating uranium mines 
declined from 730 to 320, while only thirteen of twenty-four processing 
mills remained in operation.25 The government belatedly recognized that 
the continuing collapse of the uranium industry threatened the antici-
pated long-run expansion of commercial nuclear power. In order to 
prevent a total collapse of the uranium industry, the AEC agreed to 
purchase limited quantities of uranium at the fixed price of eight dollars 
per pound. The eight dollar price was selected because it was thought 
20. Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1975, at 8, col. I. 
21. J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS 157 (1983). 
22. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239 (4th 
Cir. 1987). 
23. Congress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987), initiated the program generally known as the "Atoms-for-
Peace Program." 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987) formulated "a program 
to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes. . . . " 
24. The AEC was vested with responsibility for effectuating the "Atoms-for-Peace 
Program," including the development of a commercial nuclear electric industry. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2031-2040 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). 
25. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse 
Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. I 19, 130 (1977). 
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to be low enough to discourage further overproduction of uranium, yet 
high enough to keep some private uranium firms in business until 
commercial demand developed to a point where supply and demand 
were in balance. 
When a small commercial market developed in the 1970s, the uranium 
industry remained trapped in a market where it could not exceed the 
eight dollar limit set by the AEC. The increasing commercial demand 
for uranium did not raise prices because the demand was still so small 
that it could be satisfied from existing reserves. In classic economic 
theory, the price could have been adjusted upward by decreasing the 
supply of uranium, but in practice this option was not feasible. Func-
tioning uranium mines had to remain operational in order to avoid 
flooding and other types of deterioration that would make reopening of 
the mines expensive. In turn, the continued production of uranium 
tended to glut the market and hold prices at the eight dollar level 
imposed by the AEC. Also, the role that Westinghouse had played in 
depressing the open market price of uranium was soon to be revealed. 
Westinghouse became the world's largest middleman supplier of ura-
nium largely as a sideline to its major focus of constructing nuclear 
power plants. Westinghouse offered utility companies a complete nuclear 
,fuel system that included the nuclear reactor, steam generating system, 
'fuel core, and an agreement to supply fuel reloads at the eight dollar 
market price.26 Such turnkey reactors were an attractive and necessary 
inducement to utility companies who possessed little expertise in the 
burgeoning nuclear power industry. The Westinghouse turnkey package, 
combined with the ABC's willingness to sell off its stockpile, induced 
many utility companies to convert to nuclear power in the expectation 
that the eight dollar price of uranium would continue into the foreseeable 
future. (It had remained relatively constant for ten years.) The utilities 
chose to ignore those economists who warned that the eight dollar price 
could not be maintained in light of the serious inconsistency between 
long-run demand and supply-side behavior at the current market price. 
Market analysts warned that while demand would grow rapidly, there 
was no corresponding increase in production or exploration for new 
sources of uranium. Between 1973 and 1975, events brought the uranium 
market in line with economic projections. 
The year 1973 commenced with a dramatic increase in the number 
of nuclear reactors beginning commercial operation. Thirty-one reactors 
came on line, some two-and-a-half times more than in the previous five 
26. For a description of the method of generating electric power by atomic energy, 
see Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental Issues in Nuclear 
Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869, 872-74 (1975). 
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years.21 When the new plants began full-time operations, the utilities 
belatedly turned their attention to uranium supplies. They found little 
available uranium because existing stockpiles and limited production 
capacities were already committed to other buyers. At the same time, 
the AEC withdrew its huge stockpile from commercial sales.28 In des-
peration, the utilities were driven back to the open market where they 
actively bid against each other to secure uranium supplies for their 
expensive new plants. 
Rumors that Westinghouse would not be able to fulfill its contract 
obligations to supply uranium further fueled the price rise. Unconfirmed 
reports of the Westinghouse uranium shortage began circulating in early 
1974, and on July 14, 1975, Westinghouse publicly confirmed that it 
was short between forty and sixty million pounds of the uranium promised 
for the period of 1978 to 1995. The market reacted strongly to this 
news as the price of uranium rose to thirty-five dollars a pound within 
a six-month period. By the time the utility companies filed suit against 
Westinghouse, the price had risen to over forty dollars a pound; West-
inghouse would be required to sustain a loss of two billion dollars. 
Westinghouse's dilemma raised the obvious question of how the com-
pany could have allowed itself to become so seriously oversold, under-
supplied, and underpriced. One economist opined that "Westinghouse's 
policy of going short appears to be irrational."29 There is now little 
doubt that Westinghouse was poorly managed during this period. West-
inghouse had concentrated on nuclear plant construction where it was 
losing an estimated $200 to $250 million for its turnkey reactor contracts. 
Westinghouse also faced serious cash flow problems and substantial 
reorganization of the corporation. At times like these, failures of com-
mand, communication, and control frequently occur. Thus, it is possible 
that, unless the shortage was an oversight, the only rational explanation 
was that Westinghouse had speculated on three future developments 
that never came about. For example, Westinghouse may have counted 
on the AEC reversing itself and releasing its huge stockpile at the eight 
dollar price, or Westinghouse may have gambled that once import 
restrictions were removed, cheap uranium could be obtained from foreign 
sources.3° Finally, Westinghouse may have hoped that reprocessing of 
27. The first license for a nuclear power plant was issued in 1958. As of the present 
date, some 82 licenses have been issued. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239, 247 (4th Cir. 1987). 
28. As the Fourth Circuit observed: "[t]he development of a program of peaceful use 
of nuclear power as authorized by Congress, begun with such enthusiasm, has since 
experienced a chequered career, marked by many changes in official policy .... " Id. at 
240. 
29. Joskow, supra note 25, at 145. 
30. Enriched uranium was prohibited from import until 1973, but the AEC started 
relaxing restraints to begin in 1977, with all restrictions to be phased out by 1984. 
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spent uranium fuel would become commercially feasible.31 None of these 
events came to pass, and Westinghouse's policy, if it was a conscious 
policy, was not well thought out. 
Westinghouse, however, adamantly refused to concede that it was the 
architect of its own misfortune. Instead, Westinghouse blamed its short-
age on the OPEC oil embargo and on a foreign cartel which conspired 
to fix inflated prices while freezing Westinghouse out of the uranium 
market. Along with notification of its inability to deliver the promised 
uranium, Westinghouse confronted its utility customers with a legal and 
economic memorandum justifying its withdrawal from the uranium 
supply contracts. Westinghouse relied upon section 2-615, the "com-
mercial impracticability" provision of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) as excusing any legal obligation to honor the contracts.32 
The commercial impracticability clause of the UCC is the broadest 
and least understood of a variety of legal excuses from contract per-
formance. In Judge Merhige's opinion, the essence of the commercial 
impracticability defense is that it is manifestly unfair to require a party 
to a contract to perform the agreement when an unanticipated event 
radically increases the difficulty of performance.33 Other courts have 
referred to commercial impracticability as a question of fundamental 
equity or justice.34 Nebulous concepts of justice, however, are not easily 
applied to the complexities of international commerce between modern 
multinational corporations. In an attempt to structure vague concepts 
of equity, the drafters of the UCC formulated guidelines for establishing 
the defense of commercial impracticability.35 Westinghouse interpreted 
these guidelines as requiring that economic impracticability be caused 
by the occurrence of an unforeseen contingency. Westinghouse argued 
that the economic impracticability of the uranium contracts was obvious 
31. The reprocessing or disposal of spent fuel has been described as the "most pressing" 
concern in commercial nuclear power development. Florida Power & Light Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1987). In 1977, President Carter 
deferred indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced 
in commercial nuclear power plants. Id. at 245. 
Id. 
32. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1983) provides: 
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not a breach 
of his duty under a contract for sale if perfonnance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made .... 
33. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Cont. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 454 
(E.D. Va. 1981). 
34. Impracticability of performance is "essentially an equitable defense" resting firmly 
on the unfairness and unreasonableness of giving the contract the absolute force which 
its own words clearly state. 18 s. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, -
§ 1931 (3d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1988). 
35. See supra note 32. 
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in light of a potential loss of two billion dollars. As to the requirement 
that an unforeseen contingency must occur, Westinghouse pointed to 
the unprecedented oil embargo and the actions of a secret international 
cartel which had distorted the uranium market. 
The utility companies disputed the Westinghouse view of commercial 
impracticability, filing suit in a Pennsylvania state court and in thirteen 
federal district courts throughout the country. The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation36 recognized the need for central management 
by a single judge, and ordered the federal suits transferred to Richmond 
for consolidated pretrial discovery before Merhige.37 Merhige was selected 
for the task because his reputation for "managing" complex litigation38 
suggested that he was best able to deal with the complicated issues and 
to supervise the litigation toward its "most just and expeditious 
termination. "39 
At this stage of the proceedings, Merhige was not given final control 
of the Westinghouse case because the utilities' suits were consolidated 
only for the limited purpose of pretrial discovery. In the federal judicial 
system, such discovery proceedings avoid trial by ambush while allowing 
the parties to examine much of the other side's case prior to trial. After 
an informed appraisal of the strengths of the opponent's case, the parties 
are better able to balance the likely outcome of a trial against the 
benefits of an out-of-court settlement. In order to facilitate settlement, 
pretrial discovery in the federal system is quite broad. However, as 
international business activity has expanded, discovery in foreign nations 
has become increasingly important. Efforts to obtain evidence abroad 
often come into conflict with divergent national precepts of economics 
and politics. Thus, Westinghouse's attempts to discover information about 
the international uranium cartel proved to be a very troubling aspect 
of the case. 
B. International Discovery 
Westinghouse blamed the cartel for the dramatic rise in uranium 
prices, but this charge was difficult to prove in light of the cartel's 
efforts to camouflage its activities.40 Westinghouse alleged that the cartel 
36. See generally Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 577 (1977). 
37. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Cont. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.L. 
1975). The thirteen federal suits were consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
38. Merhige's handling of school busing cases had attracted national attention. See 
Bacigal & Bacigal, A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's Role in Court-Ordered 
Busing, 3 J. LAW & POL. 693 (1987). 
39. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Cont. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316, 319 
(J.P.M.L. 1975). 
40. For an account of the "detective" work required to uncover the cartel, see J. 
STEWART, THE PARTNERS 170-81 (1983). 
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began a producer's conspiracy in Paris in February, 1972 culminating 
in a formal agreement executed in Johannesburg, South Africa in June 
of that year.41 The participants in the cartel included most major 
producers in Canada, France, South Africa, and Australia, who accounted 
for substantially all the uranium sold outside the United States and fqr 
a large portion of American uranium imports. Upon its formation, the 
cartel began a concerted withdrawal of surplus uranium from the open 
market. The cartel initially set uranium prices below the eight dollar 
American figure, but the cost of uranium rose steadily as the cartel 
gained confidence that the conspiracy would succeed.42 Ultimately, the 
cartel successfully established a minimum world price for uranium and 
allocated sales by country and by producer within each country. A 
systematic boycott to exclude Westinghouse from the uranium market 
began with the cartel's agreement that "reactor manufacturers or any 
other middleman"43 were to be charged thirty cents per pound more 
than other buyers. By the mid-1970s, the cartel refused to make any 
sales to Westinghouse at all. 
In order to conceal its activities, the cartel agreed to a rigged bidding 
system in which one "leader" quoted the agreed-upon minimum price, 
while other companies quoted higher prices in order to create the 
appearance of competition. The cartel further camouflaged its price-
fixing activities by naming itself the Uranium Marketing Research 
Organization, and by releasing a cover story that it was an organization 
engaged in the legitimate exchange of marketing information. Westing-
house claimed that the cartel's concealment was so successful that its 
existence was discovered only by the fortuitous acts of environmental 
groups. The "Australian Friends of the Earth" environmental organi-
zation obtained cartel documents from the files of an Australian uranium 
producer and subsequently released the documents to the public. West-
inghouse then sought to obtain additional documents . that had passed 
between the members of the cartel, as well as the notes of all cartel 
meetings.44 Efforts to obtain the documents in Australia, Canada, France, 
and South Africa were frustrated when those countries passed regulations 
to forbid disclosure of cartel documents. Westinghouse's last hope for 
procuring the documents hinged upon subpoenaing records from Rio 
Tinto Zinc (RTZ), a British mining conglomerate which was part of 
the cartel. 
Unlike the other cartel countries, the English government had not 
passed regulations protecting the cartel. On the contrary, England was 
41. Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications, 
14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 70-71 (1979). 
42. Id. at 74-75. 
43. Id. at 76. 
44. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547, 559. 
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signatory to a 1970 Hague Convention designed to promote mutual 
judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters.45 The signatory 
nations to the Hague Convention agreed to facilitate discovery in foreign 
lawsuits in return for exercising the same privilege when foreign testi-
mony was needed in suits arising in their own courts. Citing the British 
commitment to judicial cooperation, Westinghouse asked Merhige to 
issue letters rogatory to the English courts. These letters are commissions 
from one judge to another requesting the examination of a witness and 
the reception of other evidence. Merhige issued the letters on October 
21, 1976, and, in the spirit of judicial cooperation, assured the English 
courts that "[w]e shall be ready and willing to do the same for you in 
a similar case when required." Reviewing this "courteous request from 
Judge Merhige,"46 Lord Denning of the High Court of England held 
that "[i]t is our duty and our pleasure to do all we can to assist that 
court, just as we would expect the United States court to help us in 
like circumstances. 'Do unto others as you would be done by."'47 
Over the objection of the RTZ Corporation, Lord Denning complied 
with Merhige's request that RTZ executives be ordered to appear before 
a consular officer at the United States Embassy in London. When issuing 
the subpoenas, however, Lord Denning cautioned the hearing examiner 
to avoid a "fishing expedition."48 English law does not permit as broad 
a scope of discovery as does the American judicial system, and thus 
Lord Denning warned that the American court may not ask for something 
that goes further than what is permissible in English domestic pro-
45. See generally Sadoff, The Hague Evidence Convention: Problems at Horne of 
-Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 20 INTL LAW. 659 (1986). 
10 
46. The letter read as follows: 
The People of the United States of America to the High Court of Justice in England. 
Greetings: Whereas, certain actions are pending in our District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, in which the corporations listed in Schedule 
A attached hereto are plaintiffs and Westinghouse Electric Corporation is defendant, 
and it has been shown to us that justice cannot be done among the said parties 
without the testimony, which is intended to be given in evidence at the trial of the 
actions, of the following persons residing in your jurisdiction, being directors ... of 
the RTZ Services Ltd .... nor without the production of certain documents in the 
possession of the RTZ Services Ltd. . . . related to the existence and terms of 
various agreements, arrangements or concerted practices between RTZ Services Ltd. 
and the following entities ... Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd. (England) .... And 
whereas the existence and terms of such agreements, arrangements or concerted 
practices are relevant to the matters in issue in the actions at present in this court. 
We, therefore, request that in the interest of justice, you cause by your proper 
and usual process [Sir Ronald Mark Cunliffe Turner and others] ... to appear 
before any consul or vice-consul or other consular officer of the United States at 
London ... to be examined orally as witnesses ... and ... cause the said RTZ 
Services Ltd .... to produce the documents enumerated in Schedule B hereto, being 
documents which appear to be or to be likely to be in the possession, custody, or 
power of the RTZ Services Ltd .... 
47. 'Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 560. 
48. Id. at 561-62. 
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ceedings.49 Lord Denning also noted that the question of self-incrimination 
might arise at the embassy hearing. Although the uranium cartel had 
not violated English law, there was the possibility of sanctions by the 
European Economic Community which had outlawed cartels, or by the 
United States government under its antitrust laws. Having reserved any 
ruling upon these potential problems, Lord Denning upheld the letters 
rogatory and ordered seven directors of RTZ to appear at the American 
Embassy on June 8, 1977. 
The potential legal problems suggested by Lord Denning were realized 
on the very first day of the embassy hearing. The leadoff witness at 
the hearings was Lord Shackleton, Chairman of the RTZ Corporation 
and Chairman of the Honors Committee of the House of Lords. (The 
prestigious Committee awards knighthood, peerage, and similar high 
honors.) The embassy hearing took place during Jubilee Week, when 
the British were celebrating Queen Elizabeth's twenty-fifth anniversary 
as Monarch. At a time of such national pride, Lord Shackleton seemed 
uncomfortable asserting the American fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Nonetheless, he declined to answer all questions. 
The attorneys for both sides also engaged in vigorous debate over 
what was and was not relevant documentary evidence. The internationally 
famous lawyers quickly overpowered the outmatched embassy official 
who attempted to conduct the hearing. The embassy official put in a 
frantic call to Merhige, and the lawyers joined in to complain that they 
had been in London for six days and still did not have an answer to 
their first question. They pleaded with Merhige to come to London. 
Merhige declined, but offered to send the special maste~ he had 
appointed to the case, former U.S. Senator William B. Spong, Jr. The 
lawyers protested that only Merhige could handle the proceedings, or 
at least make the fundamental rulings necessary to get things started. 
Merhige remained reluctant to journey to England until the lawyers 
informed him that Lord Denning had suggested that perhaps the Amer-
ican judge should come to England and preside over the proceedings. 
The lawyers insisted that "[i]f you don't come, you will be insulting 
Lord Denning."51 
Skeptical of the lawyers' claim, but unwilling to run the risk of 
offending the British, Merhige boarded the supersonic Concorde and 
convened court in the American Embassy in London. While Merhige 
would gain a place in history as the first federal judge to hold court 
in England, his actions placed him in conflict with the United States 
49. Id. at 555. 
50. Special masters are appointed by judges to serve a special role in the case, such 
as supervising discovery. See FED. R. C1v. P. 53; Berger, Away from the Court House 
and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978). 
51. See supra note 19. 
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Department of Justice and the administrative offices of the Federal 
Courts. Before leaving for England, Merhige placed a hurried call to 
the administrative offices to inquire how his expenses would be handled. 
"The parties have agreed to pay all costs," he explained, "but I do not 
want to take money from any party to this case. How can we handle 
it so that the parties pay your office directly?" At the other end of the 
phone Merhige heard the muffled cries of a startled bureaucrat: "Don't 
do this to us, Judge, the paper work is just too complicated!"52 In spite 
of the bureaucrat's plea, Merhige journeyed to England and had his 
expenses prorated among the parties to the case. 
Upon his return to Richmond, Merhige was informed that an angry 
Chief Justice Burger demanded an explanation for the trip to England. 
In his best "make my day" tone Merhige responded, "[y]ou tell the 
Chief Justice that I don't work for him!" The next day, Clement 
Haynesworth, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals asked 
Merhige to tender an explanation to the Chief Justice. Merhige remained 
adamant. "With all due respect, I don't work for the Chief, and, in 
fact, my judicial acts are reviewable only by my Court of Appeals." 
Haynesworth then asked Merhige to respond as a personal favor. Merhige 
relented to the extent that he wrote a personal letter addressed to 
Haynesworth. "What you do with the letter," Merhige explained, "is 
your business." Haynesworth subsequently informed the Chief Justice 
that Merhige had "graciously consented" to discuss the case. Haynes-
worth added that Merhige did not ask permission to go to England, but 
if he had, Haynesworth would have advised Merhige that it was his 
duty to go. Merhige never heard anything further from Chief Justice 
Burger. Although Burger did encourage a resolution by the Judicial 
Conference that it was against policy for federal judges to hold court 
abroad,53 a resolution is widely ignored in international cases.54 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. When disregarding the judicial infighting, Merhige offers what he regards as a 
perfectly reasonable explanation for his conduct: 
I know Chief Justice Burger quite well, and he is someone I respect, admire, and 
like. But neither he nor anyone else may show less than proper respect to the District 
Court. I certainly wouldn't defer to the Chief Justice any more than I defer to my 
own father! 
See supra note 19. 
Merhige explains: 
Id. 
When my father visits Richmond, I often have him sit on the bench with me. During 
one trial, he fell asleep and I had the Marshall remove him from the courtroom. 
My mother was furious that I could act that way toward my father, but I told her 
that in the courtroom I don't have a father or mother, or any friends. 
To Merhige, "the bottom line is that I love my father, and I admire the Chief Justice, 
but in my capacity as a federal judge I demand proper respect. Not to me personally, 
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Merhige had been willing to travel to England, "or to the ends of 
the earth," he insisted, in order to help promote settlement of the case.ss 
He sensed that denying foreign discovery would create an issue for 
appeal and thus make Westinghouse less willing to negotiate a pretrial 
settlement. Merhige concluded that the administrative problems created 
by foreign discovery were outweighed by the possibility that full discovery 
would enhance settlement efforts.s6 While the administrative headaches 
he created were a source of irritation to Merhige, his problems with 
the Justice Department were of a more serious nature. 
After convening the hearing in London, Merhige upheld the privilege 
against self-incrimination and instructed Lord Shackleton that he need 
not answer the questions, nor produce the documents requested in the 
letters rogatory. Westinghouse immediately protested Merhige's ruling 
to United States Attorney General Griffin Bell who sent two represen-
tatives on the flight to London that night. They delivered a forceful 
letter: 
Dear Judge Merhige, 
The United States Department of Justice ("Department") has been informed by 
counsel for Westinghouse Electric Corporation that to date the depositions of certain 
employees of the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, which are being taken in England pursuant 
to letters rogatory issued by your court . . . have been totally unproductive due to 
assertions of the United States fifth amendment privilege by the witnesses. We have 
also been informed that counsel for the letters rogatory deponents have indicated that 
all future witnesses will likewise assert their privilege against self-incrimination and 
refuse to testify. 
As you undoubtedly know, the Department is currently conducting a grand jury 
investigation into certain aspects of the domestic and international uranium industry, 
including the possibility that non-U.S. uranium producers, one of which is Rio Tinto 
Zinc Corporation Ltd., have engaged in conduct violative of United States antitrust 
laws. In the course of this investigation the Department has attempted, with little or 
no success, to obtain information directly from foreign uranium producers and their 
officers and employees. We therefore believe that the depositions taken pursuant to the 
letters rogatory issued by this court might well be the sole opportunity for our grand 
jury to obtain information vital to its investigation and deem it necessary to its orderly 
functioning that full discovery pursuant to the letters rogatory be had. 
Accordingly to eliminate what may be a major obstacle to discovery in the letters 
rogatory proceedings, the Government represents to this court and to the letters rogatory 
deponents listed below that it will not utilize, either directly or indirectly, the deposition 
testimony of a witness which is given pursuant to letters rogatory issued by this court 
as a basis for criminal prosecution of that witness for a violation of any United States 
law. This representation applies to the following individuals .... 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact C. Forrest Bannan." 
but to this court as an institution." In fairness, it must be po\nted out that Merhige 
accords full and proper respect to the Chief Justice's institutional status. Merhige and 
Chief Justice Burger served together for six years on the five-member Executive Council 
of the Judicial Conference, and according to Merhige, "we are on a first name basis. 
That is, he calls me Bob and I call him Mr. Chief." Id. 
55. See supra note 19. 
56. Id. 
57. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 628-29. 
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On June 16, 1977, Mr. Bannan appeared on behalf of the United 
States Department of Justice at a resumed hearing before Merhige at 
the United States Embassy. Bannan stated that it was the firm policy 
of the Department of Justice not to grant formal immunity to a witness 
in a civil dispute between private litigants such as Westinghouse and 
the utility companies. According to Department regulations only gov-
ernment witnesses in federal criminal prosecutions could be granted 
immunity. In light of this firm policy, Bannan explained, the most the 
Department could offer was the Attorney General's written promise not 
to use the sought-after evidence in a criminal prosecution. Bannan also 
emphasized to Merhige that the evidence Westinghouse sought was 
considered to be of paramount importance to the Justice Department, 
and that previous efforts to obtain such evidence in Canada, Australia, 
South Africa, and France had been unsuccessful. Despite Bannan's 
forceful plea, Merhige ruled that the Attorney General's letter could 
not set aside the privilege against self-incrimination. Absent a formal 
grant of immunity, the witnesses would not be required to answer any 
questions that might incriminate them.58 
The Justice Department's heavy-handed attempts to sway Merhige 
outraged the officials of the English legal system. An aide-memoire was 
delivered to the State Department expressing Her Majesty's Govern-
ment's concern at this attempt to obtain evidence for a criminal antitrust 
investigation by intervening in a civil case. The British stressed a "strong 
hope that the Department of Justice will desist from its attempts to 
undermine ... [agreed upon] procedures and discontinue its inter-
vention."59 In spite of the British protest, the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Justice Department reversed its policy and authorized an application 
to Merhige for a formal grant of immunity which would require Lord 
Shackleton to respond to the discovery requests of the parties. 
During the hearings on the application to grant immunity, RTZ sent 
its English barristers to Merhige's courtroom in Richmond. Despite their 
considerable charm,60 the barristers could not dissuade Merhige from 
issuing the grant of immunity. Under the applicable statutes, a federal 
judge has no discretion and must honor the Justice Department's request 
for immunity. When the English barristers lost the battle in Merhige's 
58. See supra note 19. 
59. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 629. 
60. To Merhige, the most enjoyable aspect of the Westinghouse case was the quality 
of the lawyers. Lead counsel in the case, Lewis T. Booker of Hunton & Williams and 
John S. Battle, Jr. of McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, are generally regarded as 
outstanding members of the Bar. Merhige, however, has an especially fond remembrance 
of the English barristers. Even without their wigs and robes the barristers occasionally 
forgot themselves and addressed Merhige as "Your Lordship-oh, I beg your pardon, 
Your Honor." Merhige would always reply, "No, no, that's perfectly all right. Your 
Lordship will do just fine. You American lawyers pay attention to this." See supra note 
19. 
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court, they took the legal war back to the British House of Lords. 
Complicated issues of international law were raised in the appeal, 
although the intriguing questions were expressed in typically understated 
British fashion-"[there is] some degree of procedural confusion as to 
the capacity in which Judge Merhige was doing the various things he 
did."61 The fundamental legal question concerned Merhige's official 
status in London. Was he acting as judge of an American court, or was 
he merely a hearing examiner appointed by the English courts? Lord 
Denning had initially appointed a low-ranking officer of the American 
Embassy to conduct the hearings. It was suggested that when Merhige 
arrived in London he was merely taking the part of the embassy official 
and acting as a subordinate of Lord Denning.62 Aside from threatening 
Merhige's place in history as the first federal judge to hold court in 
England, the controversy presented serious legal questions. The grant 
of immunity issued by Merhige in Richmond applied only to testimony 
given pursuant to this court's orders.63 If the British courts in London 
were ordering the witnesses to appear and testify at the American 
Embassy, then by its own terms Merhige's grant of immunity would 
not protect the witnesses. 
These technical issues were never resolved because the British Justice 
Department sought a direct political confrontation with its American 
counterpart. The English Attorney General petitioned the House of 
Lords to resolve the long-standing controversy between the British gov-
ernment and the government of the United States as to the claim of 
the latter to have jurisdiction to enforce its antitrust laws against British 
companies. The British regarded the American court's investigation of 
antitrust activities outside the United States as an unacceptable invasion 
of British sovereignty. Previous attempts by the American government 
to use the federal courts in this investigatory role had been the subject 
of diplomatic protests.64 It was clear to the British that an American 
grand jury investigating criminal antitrust charges lacked authority to 
subpoena the records of a British company. Nonetheless, in March of 
1977 the federal grand jury investigating criminal charges against the 
cartel issued subpoenas duces tecum requiring the parties to the West-
inghouse case to deliver any RTZ documents obtained as part of the 
civil discovery proceedings.65 Thus, the Justice Department had at-
61. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 638. 
62. See supra note 19. 
63. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 639. 
64. Id. at 591. 
65. Westinghouse filed an antitrust suit in Chicago in 1976 against 12 foreign and 
17 domestic producers of uranium. Westinghouse ultimately reached a negotiated settlement 
in the antitrust suit, and the proceeds from that settlement were utilized in negotiating 
settlements of the utilities' suits. Interview with John S. Battle, Jr., private counsel, 
McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, in Richmond, Virginia (July 29, 1986) [hereinafter 
Battle interview]. 
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tempted, rather transparently, to do indirectly what it could not do in 
an open fashion. The American government portrayed itself as appealing 
to the British agreement to foster discovery in civil cases, while the 
United States was actually investigating a criminal matter. The British 
Attorney General opined that "[i]t cannot be right .... " 66 
The House of Lords ultimately sided with the British Justice De-
partment in upholding RTZ's claim of privilege. Although Merhige's 
grant of immunity had removed the threat of criminal prosecution in 
America, the House of Lords cited the possibility that the European 
Economic Community (EEC) would impose sanctions for violating its 
directive against cartels. Westinghouse sought to discount this possibility 
by arguing that there was no real or appreciable danger of sanctions 
because the EEC had tacitly approved of the cartel almost from its 
beginning in 1972. Throughout the four-year existence of the cartel the 
EEC in Brussels had never taken any action to interfere with or to 
break up the uranium monopoly. In spite of the EEC's inaction, the 
House of Lords expressed concern with what might happen if the 
requested documents were produced in the Westinghouse case. The 
House of Lords concluded that "the resulting publicity in this sensitive 
political field might result in pressure on the Commission" to impose 
future penalties; thus, the threat of sanctions was not entirely "fanciful. " 67 
So long as there remained any possibility of criminal sanctions, the 
House of Lords ruled that RTZ was entitled to legitimately assert the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The final result of all the international 
proceedings was the conclusion that the cartel documents would not be 
produced. Westinghouse had reached a dead end and was left to make 
its case as best it could without the documents it had fought so hard 
to obtain. 
With the procedural aspects of international discovery resolved, Mer-
hige sought to begin trial on the merits of the case. He had been given 
initial control of the case only for purposes of pretrial discovery. There-
fore, in theory, the utility companies could now return to their home 
jurisdictions for trial. Merhige, however, expressed his hesitancy to 
transfer the cases to diverse jurisdictions and require other judges to 
duplicate his efforts to become familiar with the essential facts of the 
controversy. 68 The parties themselves were unsure whether they should 
seek trial in their home jurisdictions, or remain before Merhige for the 
conclusion of the case. On the one hand, lawyers often prefer to have 
a hometown jury when representing a local utility company against a 
national corporation like Westinghouse. However, the utilities also rec-
ognized that because of his familiarity with the situation Merhige could 
66. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. at 631. 
67. Id. at 637. 
68. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 25, 1978, at A-7, col. 8. 
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best deliver a speedy disposition of the case. A quick resolution of the 
controversy, through adjudication or ADR, was highly desirable because 
existing uranium supplies were running low. The utilities had to determine 
whether they could obtain the uranium from Westinghouse, or whether 
they had to search for it elsewhere. Certainty, at this point, was more 
important than squeezing the last dollar out of a jury verdict. All but 
two utilities volunteered to keep the case before Merhige. 
The primary opposition to Merhige's jurisdiction came from counsel 
for Kansas Gas & Electric who argued that, "[w]e're not just looking 
for a negotiated settlement. We want to try this case openly in Kansas 
where we truly believe in the sanctity of a man's word. It wasn't long 
ago that if a man broke a contract in Kansas, why we would hang 
him." When the courtroom laughter died down, Merhige informed the 
red-faced counsel "[t]hat ends the matter. I'm not sending any of these 
corporate executives to a jurisdiction where they can be lynched." 
Counsel good-naturedly accepted the consequences of his overstatement, 
and Kansas Gas & Electric and Con Edison of New York were placed 
in a holding status while the majority of the plaintiffs went to trial 
before Merhige on the issue of commercial impracticability.69 
C. Commercial Impracticability 
Although the defense of commercial impracticability is a relatively 
new concept, its roots trace back to early English common law. Originally 
the common law imposed an absolute responsibility for performance on 
the parties to a contract. Any failure of performance, whatever the 
reason, constituted a breach of the contract for which the defaulting 
party was required to pay damages.70 In the nineteenth century, the 
common law tempered this rule of absolute liability by recognizing 
certain legal defenses which would excuse a party from performance. 
If a party prevailed using one of these defenses, the contract was said 
to be discharged rather than breached. The first recognized defense 
was factual impossibility which existed whenever the means of carrying 
out the contract was no longer physically possible. For example, a 
contract would be voided by the death of an entertainer just before a 
scheduled concert.71 In modern contracts the impossibility defense is 
often embodied in a "force majeure" clause which excuses failure of 
performance caused by acts of God, wars, floods, epidemics, and the 
like. Force majeure clauses and the concept of impossibility are defined 
69. See supra note 19. 
70. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 647 (1982) ("[T]he general rule that duties 
imposed by contract are absolute."). 
71. See generally Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract 
Law: An Economic Analysis, o J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85 (1977). 
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as situations where the use of all human strength, experience, wisdom, 
and training cannot bring about the agreed upon performance.72 
True impossibility of performance is a complete defense, but it is 
strictly defined and difficult to establish in practice. Modern commercial 
transactions, such as Westinghouse's uranium supply contracts, rarely 
involve situations in which performance is truly impossible. No matter 
what the occurrence, an equivalent method of performance can often 
be found, albeit at a price substantially higher than that in the contract. 
In order to temper the harshness of the impossibility defense, the common 
law recognized an additional concept of "frustration of purpose." In 
such situations performance is physically possible, yet the underlying 
purpose of the contract is no longer attainable. The most famous examples 
of this doctrine were the cases surrounding the coronation of King 
Edward VII of England.73 In these cases, hopeful spectators leased 
apartments along the coronation's processional route in order to catch 
a glimpse of their new monarch. The apartments were rented for just 
one day and the only purpose of the lease was to give the renters a 
splendid view of the procession. When the procession was cancelled due 
to Edward's illness, the renters sought release from the rental agreement 
on the ground that the underlying purpose of the contract had been 
frustrated. The English courts ultimately divided on the extent to which 
discharge should be allowed. The modern formulation of the frustration 
of purpose doctrine requires circumstances where performance has be-
come "so vitally different from what was anticipated [by the parties] 
that the contract cannot reasonably be thought to govern."74 
The final step in the evolution of legal excuse from contract per-
formance was the adoption of section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), which defines commercial impracticability. Under this 
concept, performance is physically possible and the underlying purpose 
of the contract is achievable, but the cost of performance is much 
higher than contemplated. The most notorious examples of this concept 
were the Suez Canal cases75 which arose when the Egyptian government 
closed the canal after the 1958 war. The closing of the canal meant 
that cargo ships were required to sail around Africa, a voyage double 
the distance and an additional one-third of the cost. In the Suez Canal 
72. The traditional formulation of the impossibility defense is set forth in Texas Co. 
v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1921). 
73. See Krel v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903). 
74. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991 (5th Cir. 
1976) (citing 6 s. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 1963, at 5511 
(rev. ed. 1938)). 
75. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 
American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'! Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2nd. Cir. 
1972). See Schlegel, Of Nuts & Ships & Sealing Wax, Suez & Frustrating Things-
The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 419 (1969). 
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cases, as in the Westinghouse case, the basic problem was to decide 
who should bear the loss resulting from an event that rendered per-
formance by one party economically unfeasible. Many prominent scholars 
have thrown up their hands at such questions and advised the court to 
"exercise its equity powers and pray for the wisdom of Solomon."76 
Merhige could not turn to divine guidance nor to any definite authority 
on commercial impracticability because there was no Supreme Court 
or other high court interpretation of the commercial impracticability 
clause. Exactly what is meant by the clause has bedeviled the lower 
courts, and Merhige's Westinghouse decision is still cited in law school 
casebooks as one of the most significant rulings on the issue. Left to 
his own resources, Merhige sought to interpret commercial impractic-
ability by examining the common law doctrines of impossibility and 
frustration of purpose. His legal research suggested that commercial 
impracticability was established if the party seeking discharge (West-
inghouse) could prove four factors: (1) was performance as agreed upon 
rendered impractical?; (2) did the impracticability arise from an un-
foreseen contingency?; (3) did the parties to the contract, explicitly or 
implicitly, allocate the risk that the contingency would occur?; and (4) 
did the party seeking discharge make all reasonable attempts to assure 
performance?77 The parties accepted this analytical framework and joined 
in battle over each of the four factors. 
D. Merhige's Decision 
At the conclusion of the evidence, legal experts felt that Westinghouse 
had made a plausible, but not overwhelming, case for commercial 
impracticability. Merhige, however, did not base his decision on the 
advice of legal scholars, nor on the sophisticated economic testimony 
of expert witnesses. Instead, he turned to fundamental principles of 
contract law and announced, somewhat facetiously, "I have not found 
the case to be a greatly complicated case."78 He explained his intuitive 
feeling that people schooled in the common law are brought up to 
believe that a deal is a deal. "That's the way business works. People 
make good deals and bad deals all the time."79 Merhige went on to 
explain that his father and grandfather were both merchants who schooled 
the young Merhige to accept the principle that making a bad bargain 
does not give you the right to weasel out of it. Throughout the trial 
76. 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1328, at 344 {1962). 
77. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Cont. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 451 
(E.D. Va. 1981). For similar analysis, see Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Found., 817 
F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1987). 
78. See supra note 19. 
79. Id. 
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Merhige warned counsel of one of his grandfather's favorite sayings: 
He who sells what isn't his'n, 
buys it back or goes to prison. 
According to Merhige, "[m]y grandfather's little maxim is the kind 
of thing that most people believe, and that's the kind of belief that 
commerce is based upon."80 While counsel for Kansas Gas & Electric 
took quite a ribbing about his statements, Merhige agrees that "there 
was a lot of truth in his observation that it wasn't long ago when a 
man could be hung for trying to back out of a contract."81 According 
to Merhige, "[a]ll the legal scholars and economists in the world can't 
change the fact that a man's word is his bond, and this applies just as 
much to businessmen."82 Merhige believed that "this whole uranium 
fiasco was a business problem which should have been resolved by 
businessmen."83 At the very start of the discovery proceedings, he 
informed the Wall Street Journal that he did not ever expect to finish 
the Westinghouse case. He expected it to be settled.84 
Merhige is both praised and criticized for his activist role in settling 
cases. At one point in the Westinghouse trial, the local newspaper 
reported the courtroom proceedings by lamenting that "Judge Merhige 
leaned on his settlement horn again yesterday."85 Merhige shrugs off 
the criticism: "Judges can't force settlement because good lawyers can't 
be forced to do anything."86 Merhige distinguishes between helping the 
parties settle a case, and moving in and taking the case away from the 
lawyers. Merhige feels that criticism of his settlement efforts comes 
from attorneys who do not like his approach of involving the parties 
themselves in direct negotiations. These attorneys fail to realize that 
Merhige becomes frustrated with "lawyer talk" when the corporate chief 
executives, who have the ultimate power of decision, remain remote 
from the litigation. Merhige believes that "when a court addresses the 
threatened survival of one of the world's corporate giants, the leaders 
of industry must get together and work out their problems so that the 
potential loss is held to a minimum."87 According to Merhige, "these 
are business problems to be resolved by businessmen. I just try to get 
both parties to recognize what strong arguments the other side has. 
Even a pancake has two sides. " 88 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See Wall St. J., June 2, 1978, at 36, col. 1. 
85. Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 22, 1978, at C-4, col. 5. 
86. See supra note 19. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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In an attempt to facilitate settlement discussions, Merhige and his 
wife, Shirley, hosted cocktail parties in their home for the lawyers and 
the corporate executives.89 It may not have been a crucial factor, but 
the social contact did facilitate discussions in a context other than 
confrontational litigation. Westinghouse Chairman Robert E. Kirby fi-
nally agreed to become involved in the negotiations and made personal 
contact with the chief executive officer of each utility. The jawboning 
paid some immediate benefits when six of the thirteen utility companies 
reached a settlement with Westinghouse before the conclusion of the 
trial. However, the other utilities remained adamant, and when all 
negotiation efforts failed, Merhige prepared to issue his ruling. 
In a time of rapid inflation, increased uncertainty in commodity prices, 
governmental protection of national corporations, and growing interna-
tional cartels, the Westinghouse case, given its size and visibility, was 
of significant importance. Merhige's decision was anxiously awaited not 
only because of its effect on Westinghouse, but also because of its 
potential to send a dramatic message to the modern multinational 
corporations controlling most of the world's trade. The stage was set 
for a momentous and definitive decision as Westinghouse insisted on 
complete discharge from its contract obligations while the utilities de-
manded full damages. Each side sought an all-or-nothing resolution of 
the long unanswered question of what constitutes commercial imprac-
ticability in modern business dealings. During its closing argument, 
Westinghouse solemnly intoned that the continuing evolution of the 
doctrine of commercial impracticability was being placed in Merhige's 
hands. In a dramatic gesture, counsel turned to Merhige and pleaded: 
"We have done the best we can to get the torch here today. I hand it 
to Your Honor."90 
Westinghouse and the utilities treated the doctrine of commercial 
impracticability as a dichotomy, as if the only choice were between 
enforcing the contract with an award of full damages or discharging 
the contract with an award of no damages. Merhige perceived a possible 
intermediate solution. He announced his position from the bench: 
[T]he Court feels constrained to state its decision that Westinghouse did not meet 
its burden of establishing that it is entitled to excuse. . . . 
The plaintiffs should not be misled by today's holding to the effect that Westinghouse 
is not excused from its contractual obligations. If anything, the Court is disposed to 
believe that, just as Westinghouse is not entitled to excuse from its contractual obligations, 
the plaintiffs are not entitled to anything near the full measure of their prayer for 
relief. 
The Court has previously stated its belief that [the position of some of the plaintiffs] 
does not take realistic account of the litigation risks either before this Court or on 
89. Will, Merhige & Rubin, supra note 17, at 213. 
90. Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 4, 1978, at F-1, col. 4. 
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appeal, nor does it take account of the equitable considerations which weigh in favor 
of compromise." 
Merhige had earlier divided the case into two aspects: (I) whether 
Westinghouse was liable for any damages or whether it was excused 
from performance; and (2) to what extent the utilities had been damaged 
by Westinghouse's default. Having resolved the issue of liability against 
Westinghouse, Merhige made another attempt to push the parties to 
settle on the damage issue: 
In some senses the questions that still remain unanswered are more important and 
perhaps more difficult of resolution than those the Court has already addressed .... 
[T]hese are cases which I think everybody admits should be settled if at all possible, 
in the public interest, and they are really business problems, and should be settled as 
business problems by businessmen as I have been urging from the very first. 
I expect the utilities and Westinghouse to enter into serious and intense negotiations 
[on the proper amount of damages] ... if it gets out of hand, I'll make whatever 
rulings I have to. I'm going to try to cut down the expense of this case, as ridiculous 
as that may sound." 
Seeking compromise and accommodation, Merhige had found the 
middle ground between the extremes of full damages or no damages. 
Merhige refused to become trapped in rigid interpretations of commercial 
impracticability, recognizing that the broader purpose of the UCC was 
embodied in such concepts as "flexible adjustment machinery" and 
equitable action when "neither sense nor justice is served."93 Merhige 
saw the flexible nature of the UCC as permitting some reduction in 
damages when commercial impracticability was less than a complete 
defense. From the bench, he suggested an approach which would break 
damages down according to how much of the price rise was due to 
Westinghouse's policy of oversell, how much damage was caused by the 
actions of the cartel or by OPEC, and any other unforeseen events. 
Although Westinghouse would be liable for the damages caused by its 
own actions, the utilities would not be permitted to recover for the 
damages caused by the cartel or by the OPEC embargo. 
Utilizing his expertise in alternative dispute resolution, Merhige offered 
each party a carrot and a stick. The utilities received an important 
bargaining chip with Merhige's recognition that Westinghouse was sub-
ject to some liability. By warning the utilities that they would not receive 
the full damages they requested, Merhige significantly strengthened 
Westinghouse's bargaining position. Merhige encouraged the parties to 
negotiate the damage award by appealing to their good faith and 
willingness to work toward fair and equitable solutions of myriad complex 
91. Excerpts from the trial record, quoted in E. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 981 n.6 (3d ed. 1980). 
92. Id. 
93. Jennings, Commercial Impractiability, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 241, 255 (1980). 
22 
INFORMAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
problems. He expressed confidence that a workable and appropriate 
resolution could be reached which would be beneficial to the parties 
and to the public as well. He kept the pressure on the parties to negotiate 
by announcing that the court would meet and confer with counsel in 
an effort to assist them in reaching an agreement. Finally, Merhige 
warned that "[i]n the event that the Court's hope in this regard does 
not reach fruition, then the Court stands ready to issue a decree which 
insures that Westinghouse pay no more, and the utilities receive no less, 
than is fair. " 94 
Merhige maintained the pressure to reach a settlement by having the 
court's special master, former U.S. Senator William B. Spong, Jr., 
conduct marathon negotiation sessions with the parties. Merhige agreed 
to counsel's request for an open-door policy which permitted any attorney 
to visit the judge's chambers without notifying other counsel. This open 
door policy was feasible only because the lawyers trusted that no 
advantage could be gained by speaking with Merhige informally. Merhige 
favored the policy because, "when I talk to lawyers, I learn more from 
them than they do from me."95 When settlement negotiations stalled, 
Merhige stepped up the pressure by moving proceedings much faster 
than most judges. Out-of-town lawyers were astonished by Merhige's 
requirement that they come to court on weekends, early mornings, and 
late evenings. At one point, Merhige threatened to have counsel work 
on "Saturdays, Sundays, and some days that aren't even on the cal-
endar."96 Local counsel smiled knowingly at Merhige's work schedule 
and referred the out-of-town lawyers to the Judicial Almanac which 
gives this insider's tip on Merhige: "Be prepared for ten hour court 
days."97 
The stalemate in the settlement negotiations developed because of 
Merhige's attempt to keep the parties guessing as to the damages he 
might ultimately award. Merhige's rejection of the commercial imprac-
ticability defense had raised the settlement ante as far as Westinghouse 
was concerned. However, the utilities also felt the pressure because they 
were left to speculate as to the extent of the compensation to be awarded. 
Merhige warned the utilities that they were "too smart" to believe that 
they had won their case and need not be concerned with proving 
damages.98 The issue of equitable damages was finally resolved when 
Westinghouse began separate negotiations with each individual utility 
company. John Battle, lead counsel for Westinghouse, concluded that 
"as long as we tried to deal with the utilities as a group, it was an 
94. See supra note 19. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 4th Cir. 30 (B. Johnson ed. 1988). 
98. See supra note 19. 
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impossible task because the common denominator became the demand 
of the most obstinate. No real progress was made until we broke up 
the group and tailored individual settlements."99 
Lewis Booker, liaison counsel for the utilities, agrees that compromise 
was possible only because of individual tailoring of the settlements. 
"Each settlement was unique," according to Booker, "because it fit the 
needs of each utility in terms of uranium, equipment, extended war-
ranties, and the like. Although the utilities received minimal cash up 
front, they received many long run concessions from Westinghouse."100 
Each settlement package (the details of which are still confidential) 
was very complex because only the experts could understand such matters 
as the economic value of a warranty extended to the year 2005. Booker 
feels that, 
Merhige was very astute in recognizing that the parties and the experts could negotiate 
on matters that a judicial verdict could not cover. For example, the utilities could agree 
to accept a turbine generator in lieu of damages, but Merhige would have been powerless 
to order that. His verdict would necessarily have been limited to computing dollar 
damages. '0 ' 
Each side ultimately benefited from the flexibility inherent in ne-
gotiated settlements. On its part, Westinghouse could manufacture a 
piece of equipment which would cost $700,000 to make, but which was 
worth $1,000,000 to a utility company. Thus, the utility could report 
to its regulatory body that it had received a $1,000,000 in compensation, 
while Westinghouse could report to its stockholders that it had paid 
only $700',000 in damages. 102 Merhige's efforts to force negotiation paid 
handsome dividends when all parties eventually settled out of court. 
Merhige was never required to assess damages and confesses that he 
had never worked so hard to avoid making a decision. When Kansas 
Gas & Electric submitted its settlement agreement to the court, Merhige 
reminded counsel of his previous reference to lynchings in Kansas and 
congratulated counsel because, "to have reached settlement in this case 
without the loss of life is a monumental accomplishment."103 
99. Battle interview, supra note 65. 
100. Interview with Lewis T. Booker, private counsel, Hunton & Williams, in Richmond, 
Va. (Aug. 5, 1986) [hereinafter Booker interview]. 
IOI. Id. 
102. Westinghouse reported its settlement with the Tennessee Valley Authority at a 
cost of $36 million. The TVA, on the other hand, put a price of $130 million on the 
value of the settlement. Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 16, 1979, at B-2, col. 6. Kansas 
Gas & Electric valued its settlement at $94 million, while Westinghouse placed the value 
at $47 million. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 15, 1980, at A-6, col. 2. Union Electric 
valued its settlement at $200 million, Westinghouse claimed costs of $125 million. Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, Dec. 21, 1979, at A-10, col. 6. The disparity in reporting the settlements 
caused major problems with the l.R.S. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1979, at 
C-4, col. 4. 
103. See supra note 19. 
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After world-wide publicity, international proceedings, four years of 
litigation,104 and vigorous debate among economists and legal scholars, 
the Westinghouse case ended with a whimper instead of a bang. Rather 
than issuing an all-or-nothing decision on commercial impracticability, 
Merhige's approach alerted the legal community to the possibility of 
equitable compromise. To Merhige, the bottom line was that the parties 
to the proceeding were satisfied. As Lewis Booker sums up the case: 
The overall feeling by everyone was that justice had really been done. The utilities 
got what they needed to continue operations, while Westinghouse was able to stay 
in business, keep its plants running and its people employed. In the final analysis, 
Westinghouse, the utilities, and the judicial system had all gotten a fair shake.'" 
Although the litigants were satisfied, many academic observers ex-
pressed disappointment over Merhige's failure to identify a general 
principle which would resolve future questions of commercial imprac-
ticability in the modern world.106 Merhige, however, offers no apologies 
for his approach: "To me, the function of a judge is not to make 
decisions which may be proper in theory, yet have disastrous effects in 
practice. As I said from the very first, these problems were basically 
business problems to be resolved by businessmen."101 Merhige expresses 
an intuitive feeling108 that, "a court should not throw all of its weight 
behind one side of an economic controversy because there are no legal 
solutions to financial problems. I gave each side some support so that 
they could bargain from equal strength. Isn't that what free enterprise 
is all about?"109 
104. The transcript of the Westinghouse proceedings was in excess of 22,000 pages. 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 16, 1979, at A-9, col. 6. 
105. Booker interview, supra note 100. 
106. See, e.g., Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 
64 B.U.L. REV. 1, 8 (1984) (objections to the "pursuit of an ephemeral equity"); Halpern, 
Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for the "Wisdom 
of Solomon," 135 PA. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (1987) (Judge Merhige's approach is intuitively 
appealing, but raises serious obstacles in the application of doctrine.). But Judge Merhige's 
approach may have served as precedent in the "ALCOA" case. Aluminium Co. of America 
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Professor Macauley's assessment 
of the real value of the ALCOA decision sounds like a description of Judge Merhige's 
actions: 
The District Judge's opinion and the uncertain result of the appeal changed the 
balance of bargaining power, but it did not impose a final result on the parties. The 
decision plus the appellate process worked as a form of coercive mediation. Faced 
with the situation, the parties worked out their own solution. 
Macauley, supra note 16, at 476. 
107. See supra note 19. 
108. Merhige has admitted that a court must often apply "its own sense of fairness." 
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Cont. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 478 (E.D. Va. 
1981). 
109. See supra note 19. 
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Ill. POSTSCRIPT 
Alternative Dispute Resolution has no generally accepted theoretical 
definition, but it does have a fundamental premise-to permit legal 
disputes to be resolved outside the courts for the benefits of all parties.110 
While offering no definitive interpretation or evaluation of Judge Mer-
hige's ADR efforts, this postscript merely acknowledges some questions, 
perhaps obvious ones, raised by the proceedings. 
The most immediate concern is the propriety of sanctions, mild though 
they may have been, applied directly to the attorneys.111 The billable 
hour syndrome112 combined with the "Type A" personality of many 
lawyers induces long hours of work without any push from a judge. 
Nonetheless, even totally dedicated attorneys reach a point where their 
interests in personal comfort may conflict with the best interests of the 
client. While no lawyer is likely to sell out his client for an extra hour 
of sleep, the pressures in the Westinghouse case were of a more covert 
and pervasive nature. The subtle effect of those pressures is apparent 
when the participants recount their version of the marathon negotiation 
sessions. 
Former U.S. Senator William B. Spong, Jr., presided over the set-
tlement negotiations while serving as special master in the case. He 
ruefully recalls Merhige's insistence that the Westinghouse litigation 
team spend its weekends negotiating in the Richmond federal court-
house.113 Many of the Westinghouse attorneys were forced to forego 
attendance at their hometown Pittsburgh Steeler football games. (These 
were the years of the Steeler's Super Bowl teams.) On Fall Sundays, 
Merhige would place counsel in a conference room while he retired to 
his chambers to watch the Redskins game on television. Periodically, 
Merhige would look in on the negotiators and ask "[h]ow are you guys 
coming? The 'Skins aren't doing well. No word yet on the Steeler game. 
Wonder why they're not announcing any score?"114 Spong admits that 
the normally pleasant courthouse took on the aura of Spandau Prison. 
The Westinghouse lawyers grudgingly forfeited their weekends for an 
entire football season, but balked at spending the next Fall under those 
same conditions. Only the timely settlement agreements allowed them 
to enjoy that second season of football. 
110. See Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Move-
ment, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425 (1986); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 
F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
111. "Many of the most effective techniques of managerial judging imposes costs which, 
because of their nature, fall heavily on lawyers (rather than being passed on to clients) . 
. . . " Elliott, Managerial Judging and Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 
312 n.22 (1986). 
112. See generally Pollack, supra note 7, at 223. 
113. Speech of William B. Spong, Jr. in Richmond, Va. (Aug. 29, 1987). 
114. Id. 
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While it may be absurd to suggest that a disgruntled fan would 
abandon his client in order to attend a football game (even one played 
by the Super Bowl Steekrs), it is just as naive to believe that the 
lawyers' personal discomfort played no part in their willingness to settle. 
The client, of course, retains final authority to approve or reject the 
lawyers' settlement proposal, but a complicated case like Westinghouse 
increases the client's dependence on the expertise of counsel. Merhige's 
approach placed counsel in an uncomfortable position of balancing, at 
least subconsciously, their personal interests against the interests of the 
client.m 
Merhige defends his tactics by noting that the parties were satisfied 
with settlement agreements, and all parties echo this feeling. The sat-
isfaction of the particular parties, however, is not always the sole measure 
of whether justice has been done. One important group not represented 
in the Judge's courtroom was the consumers of electrical power-you 
and me. To the extent that the public interest was neglected in the 
parties' settlement agreement, it may not be accurate for Merhige to 
characterize the Westinghouse case as a business dispute to be settled 
by businessmen. When the public interest is affected by the litigation, 
it is dangerous to assume that a settlement, particularly one which 
remains secret, is always beneficial simply because the parties voluntarily 
subscribe to it. As Professor Fiss queried, would the public interest be 
better served by a negotiated settlement in Brown v. Board of Education, 
or by recognition of the constitutional principle that separate is not 
equal?116 Another observer suggests that quiet deal-making undermines 
the longstanding legal notion that defendants ought to meet their accusers 
publicly. Major litigation can provide society with "sagas where we 
define good and bad."117 
Another question raised by the proceedings is whether Merhige's 
proper judicial role was to play coercive mediator or formalistically 
apply "the" law. Merhige, of course, played both roles, but even his 
efforts to define the law of commercial impracticability are subject to 
criticism because of his admittedly intuitive approach. Professor John 
Jefferies, Jr. supervised Merhige's graduate legal work at the University 
of Virginia and found that Merhige preferred to rely upon intuitive and 
practical-minded dispute resolution rather than take a technocratic ap-
proach. According to Jefferies, Merhige "has a very large share of 
common sense and great confidence in it."118 The danger is that such 
common sense may achieve beneficial results in the microcosm of a 
115. "[T]he premise behind managerial judgment is that costs to clients can be decreased 
by increasing certain costs to lawyers." Elliott, supra note 5, at 312 n.22. 
116. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985). 
117. Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1987, at 2, col. 1. 
118. Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 36, col. 3. 
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single case, but may fail to set a general standard to guide future 
decisions. Does a grandfatherly maxim-"He who sells what isn't his'n . 
. . . "-intuitively capture great wisdom, or is it a clever phrase which 
obscures rational analysis?119 
The additional questions raised by Judge Merhige's approach and any 
proposed answers are left for the reader's consideration. I merely raise 
some of the questions and observe that Judge Merhige's approach is 
innovative and controversial. Perhaps that is as it should be, and perhaps 
it is best to leave the last word to Judge Merhige-"My cases have 
been controversial, I thought that's what courts are for." 120 
119. "Managerial judges frequently work beyond the public view, off the record, with 
no obligation to provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate review." 
Resnik, supra note 8. 
120. See supra note 19. 
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